Can Leviathan governments mitigate the tragedy of the commons?

Author： Wirl F.  

Publisher： Springer Publishing Company

ISSN： 0048-5829

Source： Public Choice, Vol.87, Iss.3-4, 1996-03, pp. : 363-377

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