Author： Haering N.J.
Publisher： Springer Publishing Company
ISSN： 0048-5829
Source： Public Choice, Vol.95, Iss.3-4, 1998-06, pp. : 321-329
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Abstract
This paper builds upon probabilistic voting theory to examine vote maximizing interjurisdictional redistribution with increasing returns to scale in the production of regional public goods. We find that with interregional differences in the per capita cost of public goods, the vote maximizing interregional redistribution will seem incoherent and unfair when judged on the basis of the availability of public goods or regional incomes.
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