How to Get It. Diagrammatic Reasoning as a Tool of Knowledge Development and its Pragmatic Dimension

ISSN： 1233-1821

Source： Foundations of Science, Vol.9, Iss.3, 2004-09, pp. : 285-305

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Abstract

Discussions concerning belief revision, theory development, and ``creativity'' in philosophy and AI, reveal a growing interest in Peirce's concept of abduction. Peirce introduced abduction in an attempt to provide theoretical dignity and clarification to the difficult problem of knowledge generation. He wrote that ``An Abduction is Originary in respect to being the only kind of argument which starts a new idea'' (Peirce, CP 2.26). These discussions, however, led to considerable debates about the precise way in which Peirce's abduction can be used to explain knowledge generation (cf. Magnani, 1999; Hoffmann, 1999). The crucial question is that of understanding how we can get the new elements capable of enlarging our theories. Under these circumstances, it might be helpful to step out of the entanglement and reconsider the basis of the problem that originally triggered Peirce's interest in abduction. This will lead us to another Peircean concept, that of ``diagrammatic reasoning,'' which I discuss here in the context of his ``pragmatism.'' In this way, I hope to reach a better understanding of the contribution of ``abduction'' to the knowledge generation process.