Is there imaginary loudness? Reconsidering phenomenological method

Author: Schmicking Daniel  

Publisher: Springer Publishing Company

ISSN: 1568-7759

Source: Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences, Vol.4, Iss.2, 2005-01, pp. : 169-182

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Abstract

Because imagination constitutes an indispensable tool of phenomenology, e.g., in understanding another author’s description, in eidetic reduction, etc., the practicability of phenomenological method and its claim to objectivity ought to be reconsidered with regard to its dependence on imagination. Auditory imagery serves to illustrate problems involved in grasping and analyzing imaginative contents – loudness in this case. Similar to phonetic segmentation and classification, phenomenologists segment and classify mental acts and contents. Just as phoneticians rely on experts’ evaluations of notations to reach valid results, phenomenologists may try to develop similar agreement procedures to escape the ‘subjectivism’ of their solitary first-person approach.