Author: Drewianka Scott
Publisher: Springer Publishing Company
ISSN: 1569-5239
Source: Review of Economics of the Household, Vol.2, Iss.3, 2004-09, pp. : 303-323
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Abstract
Many recently policy proposals are intended to alter the incentives to establish or terminate family relationships, often with the goal of encouraging marriage. This paper develops a model of family structure decisions and uses it to argue that some such reforms may actually have the opposite effect. A pro-marriage reform raises both the value of marrying one’s current partner and the value of search. When the latter effect dominates, singles are less likely to form a match, and couples are more likely to separate and optimally make fewer commitments to their relationships.
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