How Verifiable Cheap-Talk Can Communicate Unverifiable Information

Author： Bloomfield Robert   Kadiyali Vrinda  

Publisher： Springer Publishing Company

ISSN： 1570-7156

Source： Quantitative Marketing and Economics, Vol.3, Iss.4, 2005-12, pp. : 337-363

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