Doubts About Cogito

Author: Dretske Fred  

Publisher: Rodopi

ISSN: 0165-9227

Source: Grazer Philosophische Studien, Vol.84, Iss.1, 2012-10, pp. : 1-17

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Abstract

Several familiar epistemological distinctions are mobilized to extract five lessons relating to self-knowledge. The focus is on cogito, the knowledge that one thinks. The distinctions include such differences as awareness of a β as opposed to awareness that it is β, being able to tell the difference between βs as opposed to being able to tell they are βs, and the (possibly) different way one knows what is β vs. the way one knows that it is β. Among the lessons extracted from these distinctions is that awareness of what one thinks is not the way one knows that one thinks. These five lessons are then featured in a story about Sarah, a child who begins the story (at the age of 3) by thinking, and being aware of what she thinks, before she understands what thinking is—before, that is, she knows she thinks. It ends by Sarah knowing she thinks. The conclusion is reached that it is plausible to suppose that, like Sarah, although we enjoy privileged access to and authority about what we think, we depend on others for our knowledge that we think.