

Author: Marks Thomas A.
Publisher: Routledge Ltd
ISSN: 0966-2847
Source: Low Intensity Conflict & Law Enforcement, Vol.13, Iss.3, 2005-0, pp. : 168-211
Disclaimer: Any content in publications that violate the sovereignty, the constitution or regulations of the PRC is not accepted or approved by CNPIEC.
Abstract
Addressing insurgency requires the same application of operational art as utilized in conventional warfare planning. Counterinsurgency strategy will be driven by the nature of the insurgent movement, with campaigns constructed to use tactics appropriately so that key facets of the insurgent campaign are neutralized. It is especially important to determine whether terror is used as a tactic (a method of action) by an insurgency or as a stand-alone strategy (a logic of action) by a challenger divorced from a mass base. Insurgencies, in turn, will normally emphasize strategically either winning allegiance of the target population or using violence as a substitute for other methods. Each of these approaches requires the weighting of the appropriate campaign elements of the counterinsurgency strategy. Sri Lanka, having faced both approaches, is an especially useful case study.
Related content


Catherine the Great: A Case for Operational Art
The Journal of Slavic Military Studies, Vol. 27, Iss. 2, 2014-04 ,pp. :


Network Centric Warfare and the death of operational art
By Dahl Erik
Defence Studies, Vol. 2, Iss. 1, 2002-03 ,pp. :


Reflections on the Counter-Insurgency Era
The RUSI Journal, Vol. 158, Iss. 4, 2013-08 ,pp. :


British Counter-Insurgency in Afghanistan
By Chin Warren
Defense and Security Analysis, Vol. 23, Iss. 2, 2007-06 ,pp. :


Jus Post Bellum and Counterinsurgency
Journal of Military Ethics, Vol. 7, Iss. 3, 2008-01 ,pp. :