Author： Stone David
Publisher： Routledge Ltd
ISSN： 1351-8046
Source： The Journal of Slavic Military Studies, Vol.22, Iss.2, 2009-05, pp. : 195-207
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Abstract
Examining Soviet urban warfare at Stalingrad, particularly in comparison to pre-war Soviet doctrine on combat in cities, suggests a number of conclusions about Soviet military performance. Soviet victory was not simply a matter of enormous human sacrifice, but also required winning the production battle with Nazi Germany. The Red Army also had to master the tactics of urban warfare from bitter experience, given the underdeveloped state of Soviet doctrine before the war and lack of relevant experience before Stalingrad. Despite that, the Soviets proved to be highly skilled at urban warfare. Given that fighting in cities requires great initiative and improvisation on the part of individual soldiers and junior officers, the Soviet victory further undermines the outdated conventional wisdom of stolid and faceless Russian soldiers.
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