Author： Cooper Robert
Publisher： Routledge Ltd
ISSN： 1361-9462
Source： Contemporary British History, Vol.22, Iss.3, 2008-09, pp. : 297-316
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Abstract
This article examines Harold Macmillan's role as Chancellor of the Exchequer during the Suez crisis in light of information now available. It argues that, contrary to present historiography, the Treasury was consistent in warning Macmillan of the dangers of the use of force, but that this advice was not accepted by Macmillan. He did not adequately pass on these warnings to his Cabinet and Egypt Committee colleagues. Though he did not lie to his colleagues about the state of the reserves when the decision to call a ceasefire was taken, the reasons that he gave for his abrupt change of mind were specious. The article concludes that American hostility was primarily responsible for the failure of the operation and that Macmillan showed a lack of judgement in not recognizing this until it was too late.
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