Author： Duus Henning
Publisher： Routledge Ltd
ISSN： 1521-0448
Source： Comparative Strategy, Vol.30, Iss.2, 2011-04, pp. : 134-153
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Abstract
A nuclear deterrence policy will probably not be effective vis-a-vis a nuclear-armed Iran the way it was effective vis-a-vis the Soviet Union and China because of the present Iranian leadership. The West faces an unprecedented asymmetrical threat. While the West will be deterred by a nuclear-armed Iran, Iran may perceive its own nuclear weapons not as a deterrent but as the facilitator of a unique eschatological opportunity towards the God-promised worldwide rule of Imamite Shi'a Islam.
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