Do Entrenched Managers Pay Their Workers More?

Publisher： John Wiley & Sons Inc

E-ISSN： 1540-6261|22-1082|1|309-339

ISSN： 0022-1082

Source： THE JOURNAL OF FINANCE, Vol.22-1082, Iss.1, 2009-02, pp. : 309-339

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