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Publisher: John Wiley & Sons Inc
E-ISSN: 1540-6261|59|6|2531-2575
ISSN: 0022-1082
Source: THE JOURNAL OF FINANCE, Vol.59, Iss.6, 2004-12, pp. : 2531-2575
Disclaimer: Any content in publications that violate the sovereignty, the constitution or regulations of the PRC is not accepted or approved by CNPIEC.
Abstract
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