Mechanism Design in Large Games: Incentives and Privacy

Author： Kearns Michael   Pai Mallesh M.   Roth Aaron   Ullman Jonathan  

Publisher： American Economic Association

ISSN： 0002-8282

Source： The American Economic Review, Vol.104, Iss.5, 2014-05, pp. : 431-435

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