

Publisher: Policy Press
ISSN: 0305-5736
Source: Policy and Politics, Vol.29, Iss.4, 2001-10, pp. : 465-475
Disclaimer: Any content in publications that violate the sovereignty, the constitution or regulations of the PRC is not accepted or approved by CNPIEC.
Abstract
This article argues that the UK Best Value regime is rooted in a 'rational' model of strategic planning that privileges performance management and external inspection and implicitly denigrades traditional forms of representative democracy. This poses important questions about how and by whom Best Value is to be defined. Central government has stressed the need for political leadership of and public involvement in Best Value. However,the regime suggests a managerial role for elected members that many councillors find unattractive. Current reforms also assume a much greater degree of public engagement than many authorities are achieving. As a result, key decisions about local public service provision may increasingly be driven by centrally determined priorities and the judgements of external inspectors whose local accountability is unclear and whose claim to superior technical knowledge remains unproven.Cet article soutient que le régime
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