REPUTATION AND OPTIMAL CONTRACTS FOR CENTRAL BANKERS

Publisher： Cambridge University Press

E-ISSN： 1469-8056|15|4|441-464

ISSN： 1365-1005

Source： Macroeconomic Dynamics, Vol.15, Iss.4, 2011-06, pp. : 441-464

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