Publisher： Cambridge University Press
E-ISSN： 1741-6183|15|2|237-247
ISSN： 0953-8208
Source： Utilitas, Vol.15, Iss.2, 2003-07, pp. : 237-247
Disclaimer: Any content in publications that violate the sovereignty, the constitution or regulations of the PRC is not accepted or approved by CNPIEC.
Abstract
Derek Parfit, Philip Pettit, and Michael Smith defend a version of consequentialism that covers everything. I argue that this version of consequentialism is false. Consequentialism, I argue, can only cover things that belong to a combination of things that agents can bring about.
Related content
Access to resources
Recommend
By Pettit Philip Brennan Geoffrey
Australasian Journal of Philosophy, Vol. 64, Iss. 4, 1986-12 ,pp. :
Friendship and Consequentialism
By Conee E.
Australasian Journal of Philosophy, Vol. 79, Iss. 2, 2001-06 ,pp. :
Consequentialism and absolutism
Australasian Journal of Philosophy, Vol. 73, Iss. 1, 1995-03 ,pp. :