Bureaucratic Expertise versus Legislative Authority: A Model of Deception and Monitoring in Budgeting

E-ISSN： 1537-5943|79|4|1041-1060

ISSN： 0003-0554

Source： American Political Science Review, Vol.79, Iss.4, 1985-12, pp. : 1041-1060

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