Publisher： Cambridge University Press
E-ISSN： 1537-5943|94|2|425-427
ISSN： 0003-0554
Source： American Political Science Review, Vol.94, Iss.2, 2000-06, pp. : 425-427
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Abstract
Bueno de Mesquita, Morrow, and Zorick analyze the evolution of crises as a two-sided incomplete information game in order to illuminate the relationship between observable military capabilities and the escalation of a dispute to armed conflict. I show that an error in the derivation of the equilibria invalidates their conclusions, and I offer a few suggestions on how to model the evolution of crises as incomplete information games.
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