Hume and the Role of Testimony in Knowledge

E-ISSN： 1750-0117|7|1|58-78

ISSN： 1742-3600

Source： Episteme, Vol.7, Iss.1, 2010-02, pp. : 58-78

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Abstract

It has been argued that Hume's account of testimony is seriously inadequate: an autonomous knower of the sort Hume defends cannot, through simple inductive methods, justify accepting another's testimony as true. This conclusion is no doubt correct. But Hume does not defend the idea of an autonomous knower, nor does he defend relying upon simple inductive methods. An examination of Hume's critique of Descartes’ method of doubt shows him as a defender of what might be called the responsible knower, and reveals the sophistication of the inductive methods he wishes to defend. It is shown that Hume can and does use these methods to justify accepting the testimony of others.