Publisher： Cambridge University Press
E-ISSN： 1750-0117|4|3|322-334
ISSN： 1742-3600
Source： Episteme, Vol.4, Iss.3, 2007-10, pp. : 322-334
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Abstract
Tyler Burge offers a theory of testimony that allows for the possibility of both testimonial a priori warrant and testimonial a priori knowledge. I uncover a tension in his account of the relationship between the two, and locate its source in the analogy that Burge draws between testimonial warrant and preservative memory. I contend that this analogy should be rejected, and offer a revision of Burge's theory that eliminates the tension. I conclude by assessing the impact of the revised theory on the scope of a priori knowledge.
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