Epistemic Authority, Testimony and the Transmission of Knowledge^†

E-ISSN： 1750-0117|4|3|368-381

ISSN： 1742-3600

Source： Episteme, Vol.4, Iss.3, 2007-10, pp. : 368-381

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Abstract

I present an account of what it is to trust a speaker, and argue that the account can explain the common intuitions which structure the debate about the transmission view of testimony. According to the suggested account, to trust a speaker is to grant her epistemic authority on the asserted proposition, and hence to see her opinion as issuing a second order, preemptive reason for believing the proposition. The account explains the intuitive appeal of the basic principle associated with the transmission view of testimony: the principle according to which, a listener can normally obtain testimonial knowledge that p by believing a speaker who testifies that p only if the speaker knows that p. It also explains a common response to counterexamples to this principle: that these counterexamples do not involve normal cases of testimonial knowledge.