Rewards and punishments: Informal contracting through social preferences

E-ISSN： 1555-7561|11|3|1145-1179

ISSN： 1933-6837

Source： THEORETICAL ECONOMICS, Vol.11, Iss.3, 2016-09, pp. : 1145-1179

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