Characterizing the Incentive Compatible and Pareto Optimal Efficiency Space for Two Players, k Items, Public Budget and Quasilinear Utilities

Author： Lerner Anat Gonen Rica

Publisher： MDPI

E-ISSN： 2073-4336|5|2|97-115

ISSN： 2073-4336

Source： Games, Vol.5, Iss.2, 2014-04, pp. : 97-115

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