The Optimal Contract under Adverse Selection in a Moral-Hazard Model with a Risk-Averse Agent

Author： Maréchal François   Thomas Lionel  

Publisher： MDPI

E-ISSN： 2073-4336|9|1|12-12

ISSN： 2073-4336

Source： Games, Vol.9, Iss.1, 2018-03, pp. : 12-12

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