Bid Resistance by Takeover Targets: Managerial Bargaining or Bad Faith?

E-ISSN： 1756-6916|52|3|837-866

ISSN： 0022-1090

Source： Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, Vol.52, Iss.3, 2017-06, pp. : 837-866

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