Principal-Agent and Informational Inefficiencies

Publisher： Nova Science Publishers, Inc.

ISSN： 1098-4143

Source： Current Politics and Economics of the United States, Canada, and Mexico, Vol., Iss., 2016-01, pp. : 119-119

Disclaimer: Any content in publications that violate the sovereignty, the constitution or regulations of the PRC is not accepted or approved by CNPIEC.

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