Publisher： Cambridge University Press
E-ISSN： 1759-0949|56|2|357-379
ISSN： 0012-2173
Source： Dialogue: Canadian Philosophical Review / Revue canadienne de philosophie, Vol.56, Iss.2, 2017-07, pp. : 357-379
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Abstract
In this paper, we consider the ‘mere-difference’ view of disability, a popular strategy amongst disability theorists and advocates. This view is nicely summarized by Elizabeth Barnes, who claims that disability is “a natural part of human diversity [and] something that should be celebrated” instead of something to be pitied or cured (2014). We find Barnes’s defence of the view problematic, argue that there are significant philosophical problems with the mere-difference view if it is intended as an accurate account of disability, and suggest that there are worrisome consequences if it is used as a politically strategic overstatement.
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