The Problem of Relevant Descriptions and the Scope of Moral PrinciplesI would like to thank Adam Arnold, Jochen Bojanowski, Matthew Dennis, Stephen Engstrom, Richard Lambert, Florian Marwede, Fabienne Peter, and Joe Saunders for their insightful comments on this paper.

Publisher： John Wiley & Sons Inc

E-ISSN： 1468-0378|25|4|1588-1613

ISSN： 0966-8373

Source： EUROPEAN JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY, Vol.25, Iss.4, 2017-12, pp. : 1588-1613

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Abstract

AbstractIn her seminal attack on modern moral philosophy, G. E. M. Anscombe claims that Kant's ‘rule about universalizable maxims is useless without stipulations as to what shall count as a relevant description of an action with a view to constructing a maxim about it’. Although this so‐called problem of relevant descriptions has received considerable attention in the literature, there is little agreement on how it should be understood or solved. My aim in this paper is, first, to clarify the problem by clearing up several misunderstandings, and, second, to show that the problem is rooted in a standard assumption about Kant's stance on the scope of moral principles—an assumption that precludes its solution. I argue that the problem consists in the fact that Kant's formula of universal law seems to stand in need of an account of moral sensibility that does not render the formula superfluous. But, as my discussion of existing solutions reveals, there can be no such account. Instead, I propose a dissolution: we should think of the formula of universal law itself as Kant's account of moral sensibility. In order to do so, we must reject the standard assumption that a principle is universal if and only if it holds for all instances of the action type that it specifies.