The future‐like‐ours argument, animalism, and mereological universalism

E-ISSN： 1467-8519|32|3|199-204

ISSN： 0269-9702

Source： BIOETHICS, Vol.32, Iss.3, 2018-03, pp. : 199-204

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Abstract

AbstractWhich metaphysical theories are involved—whether presupposed or implied—in Marquis’ future‐like‐ours (FLO) argument against abortion? Vogelstein has recently argued that the supporter of the FLO argument faces a problematic dilemma; in particular, Marquis, the main supporter of the argument, seems to have to either (a) abandon diachronic universalism (DU) or (b) acquiesce and declare that contraception is morally wrong. I argue that the premises of Marquis’ argument can be reasonably combined with a form of unrestricted composition and that the FLO argument is better viewed as including animalism, i.e., the thesis that we are animals.