Coalition strategy-proof mechanisms for provision of excludable public goods

Author： Olszewski W.  

Publisher： Elsevier

ISSN： 0899-8256

Source： Games and Economic Behavior, Vol.46, Iss.1, 2004-01, pp. : 88-114

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