Multicriteria games and potentials

Author: Patrone Fioravante  

Publisher: Springer Publishing Company

ISSN: 1134-5764

Source: TOP, Vol.15, Iss.1, 2007-07, pp. : 138-145

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Abstract

In this note we study how far the theory of strategic games with potentials, as reported by Monderer and Shapley (Games Econ Behav 14:124-143, 1996), can be extended to strategic games with vector payoffs, as reported by Shapley (Nav Res Logist Q 6:57-61, 1959). The problem of the existence of pure approximate Pareto equilibria for multicriteria potential games is also studied.