Strategic Trade Policies Under Monopsony and Uncertainty: The Exporter's Non-Linear Responses Based on the Organization of Its Industry

Author: Rakotoarisoa Manitra  

Publisher: Springer Publishing Company

ISSN: 1566-1679

Source: Journal of Industry, Competition and Trade, Vol.11, Iss.2, 2011-06, pp. : 187-201

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Abstract

Players' access to information, their market power, and the timing and rationale of their decisions are important but often neglected in the making of strategic trade policies. I examine optimal decisions in a monopsonistic market with asymmetric information to determine an exporting country's policy strategies. The large importing country first sets a producer subsidy and later imposes an import tariff after learning about the welfare-maximizing exporter's reactions to the subsidy. I assume that at the time of their decisions, the n exporting firms have incomplete information and rely only on noisy signals from their own domestic market to account for the uncertainty in the international market. I find that import tariff and producer subsidy can be substitute rather than exclusively independent policies. Results also show that the exporting country's optimal reaction is non-linear and is based on the structure of its export industry; the exporting country's government facing a large importer subsidizes (or taxes) its export when the number of exporting firms is low (or high) relative to a threshold number of firms. More important, before giving out subsidies, the exporting country's government requires more collusion of its firms especially when the large importer targets a fixed domestic price.