Author： Wu Yuliang
Publisher： Springer Publishing Company
ISSN： 0920-8550
Source： Journal of Financial Services Research, Vol.38, Iss.2-3, 2010-12, pp. : 159-186
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Abstract
Is there evidence that market forces effectively discipline risk management behaviour within Chinese financial institutions? This study analyses information from a comprehensive sample of Chinese banks over the 1998-2008 period. Market discipline is captured through the impact of four sets of factors namely, market concentration, interbank deposits, information disclosure, and ownership structure. We find some evidence of a market disciplining effect in that: (i) higher (lower) levels of market concentration lead banks to operate with a lower (higher) capital buffer; (ii) joint-equity banks that disclose more information to the public maintain larger capital ratios; (iii) full state ownership reduces the sensitivity of changes in a bank's capital buffer to its level of risk;(iv) banks that release more transparent financial information hold more capital against their non-performing loans.
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