What Is Rational About Nash Equilibria?

ISSN： 0039-7857

Source： Synthese, Vol.124, Iss.3, 2000-09, pp. : 361-384

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Abstract

Nash Equilibrium is a central concept in game theory. It has been argued that playing Nash Equilibrium strategies is rational advice for agents involved in one-time strategic interactions captured by non-cooperative game theory. This essay discusses arguments for that position: von Neumann–Morgenstern's argument for their minimax solution, the argument from self-enforcing agreements, the argument from the absence of probabilities, the transparency-of-reasons argument, the argument from regret, and the argument from correlated equilibrium. All of these arguments either fail entirely or have a very limited scope. Whatever the use of Nash Equilibrium is, therefore, it is not useful as a rational recommendation in one-time strategic interactions. This is good news for Bayesians: although this discussion does not argue directly for the Bayesian idea of rationality as expected utility maximization, it argues against a position that has been regarded as a contender in situations of strategic interaction.