

Author: Liu Fenrong
Publisher: Springer Publishing Company
ISSN: 0039-7857
Source: Synthese, Vol.175, Iss.1, 2010-07, pp. : 69-88
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Abstract
Preference is a key area where analytic philosophy meets philosophical logic. I start with two related issues: reasons for preference, and changes in preference, first mentioned in von Wright’s book The Logic of Preference but not thoroughly explored there. I show how these two issues can be handled together in one dynamic logical framework, working with structured two-level models, and I investigate the resulting dynamics of reason-based preference in some detail. Next, I study the foundational issue of entanglement between preference and beliefs, and relate the resulting richer logics to belief revision theory and decision theory.
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