Moral hazard and the demand for physician services: First lessons from a French natural experiment - Lessons from the Rand Health Insurance Experiment

Author： Chiappori P.-A.   Durand F.   Geoffard P.-Y.  

Publisher： Elsevier

ISSN： 0014-2921

Source： European Economic Review, Vol.42, Iss.3, 1998-05, pp. : 499-511

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