On relative performance contracts and fund manager's incentives - An agency theoretic approach

Author： Eichberger J.   Grant S.   King S.P.  

Publisher： Elsevier

ISSN： 0014-2921

Source： European Economic Review, Vol.43, Iss.1, 1999-01, pp. : 135-161

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