Bond restructuring and moral hazard: are collective action clauses costly?

Author： Becker T.   Richards A.   Thaicharoen Y.  

Publisher： Elsevier

ISSN： 0022-1996

Source： Journal of International Economics, Vol.61, Iss.1, 2003-10, pp. : 127-161

Disclaimer: Any content in publications that violate the sovereignty, the constitution or regulations of the PRC is not accepted or approved by CNPIEC.

Previous Menu Next

Abstract

Related content

Collective Moral Hazard, Maturity Mismatch, and Systemic Bailouts

By Farhi Emmanuel   Tirole Jean  

The American Economic Review, Vol. 102, Iss. 1, 2012-02 ,pp. : 60-93

American Economic Association

Access to resources Recommend Favorite

Moral Imagination, Collective Action, and the Achievement of Moral Outcomes

By  

Business Ethics Quarterly, Vol. 19, Iss. 1, 2009-01 ,pp. : 87-104

Cambridge University Press

Access to resources Recommend Favorite

Perfecting Imperfect Duties: Collective Action to Create Moral Obligations

By  

Business Ethics Quarterly, Vol. 6, Iss. 1, 1996-01 ,pp. : 27-42

Cambridge University Press

Access to resources Recommend Favorite

Collective Organizations versus Relative Performance Contracts: Inequality, Risk Sharing, and Moral Hazard

By Prescott E.S.   Townsend R.M.  

Journal of Economic Theory, Vol. 103, Iss. 2, 2002-04 ,pp. : 282-310

Academic Press

Access to resources Recommend Favorite

Moral hazard, renegotiation, and forgetfulness

By Squintani F.  

Games and Economic Behavior, Vol. 44, Iss. 1, 2003-07 ,pp. : 98-113

Elsevier

Access to resources Recommend Favorite