Deflationism and the Dependence of Truth on Reality

ISSN： 0165-0106

Source： Erkenntnis, Vol.75, Iss.1, 2011-07, pp. : 113-122

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Abstract

A common objection against deflationism is that it cannot account for the fact that truth depends on reality. Consider the question `On what does the truth of the proposition that snow is white depend?' An obvious answer is that it depends on whether snow is white. Now, consider what answer, if any, a deflationist can offer. The problem is as follows. A typical deflationary analysis of truth consists of biconditionals of the form `The proposition that p</i> is true iff p</i>'. Such biconditionals tell us nothing about what the truth of the proposition that p</i> might depend on. Therefore, it seems that a typical deflationist cannot give an answer. Since we know that an answer is available, this throws doubt over the adequacy of deflationism as an account of truth. Articulated here is a defence of deflationism against this objection. It is argued that although biconditionals of the sort mentioned do not explicitly state a dependency between truth and reality, they nevertheless convey one. The reason is that, given the context in which a deflationist invokes the biconditionals, such a dependency is implicated. A potential problem with this defence is that it leaves the deflationist still unable to give an account of what it is</i> for truth to depend on reality. One might think that a deflationist can offer such an account by appealing to truthmaker theory but, it is argued below, truthmaker theory is unavailable to a deflationist. Instead, the deflationist should question the assumption that an account is available.