Author： Lawrence K.M. Lowther S. Falkowski J. Jacobson R.R. Horton R.W. Peleg B.
Publisher： Elsevier
ISSN： 0165-1765
Source： Economics Letters, Vol.55, Iss.3, 1997-09, pp. : 305-308
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