Innateness and the Brain

Author: Quartz S.R.  

Publisher: Springer Publishing Company

ISSN: 0169-3867

Source: Biology and Philosophy, Vol.18, Iss.1, 2003-01, pp. : 13-40

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Abstract

The philosophical innateness debate has long relied on psychological evidence. For a century, however, a parallel debate has taken place within neuroscience. In this paper, I consider the implications of this neuroscience debate for the philosophical innateness debate. By combining the tools of theoretical neurobiology and learning theory, I introduce the ``problem of development'' that all adaptive systems must solve, and suggest how responses to this problem can demarcate a number of innateness proposals. From this perspective, I suggest that the majority of natural systems are in fact innate. Lastly, I consider the acquistion strategies implemented by the human brain and suggest that there is a rigorous way of characterizing these ``neural constructivist'' strategies as not being strongly innate. Alternatives to innateness are thus both rigorously definable and empirically supported.