Stackelberg Strategies and Collusion in Network Games with Splittable Flow

Author： Harks Tobias  

Publisher： Springer Publishing Company

ISSN： 1432-4350

Source： Theory of Computing Systems, Vol.48, Iss.4, 2011-05, pp. : 781-802

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