After You Sir. Hold-Up, Direct Externalities, and Sequential Investment

Author： De Fraja G.  

Publisher： Elsevier

ISSN： 0899-8256

Source： Games and Economic Behavior, Vol.26, Iss.1, 1999-01, pp. : 22-39

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