Adaptive Learning and Equilibrium Selection in Experimental Coordination Games: An ARCH(1) Approach

Author： Broseta B.  

Publisher： Elsevier

ISSN： 0899-8256

Source： Games and Economic Behavior, Vol.32, Iss.1, 2000-07, pp. : 25-50

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