Tacit Cooperation, Strategic Uncertainty, and Coordination Failure: Evidence from Repeated Dominance Solvable Games

Author： Van Huyck J.B.   Wildenthal J.M.   Battalio R.C.  

Publisher： Elsevier

ISSN： 0899-8256

Source： Games and Economic Behavior, Vol.38, Iss.1, 2002-01, pp. : 156-175

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