Characterization of the extreme core allocations of the assignment game

Author： Nunez M.   Rafels C.  

Publisher： Elsevier

ISSN： 0899-8256

Source： Games and Economic Behavior, Vol.44, Iss.2, 2003-08, pp. : 311-331

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