Dissolving the Explanatory Gap: Neurobiological Differences Between Phenomenal and Propositional Knowledge

ISSN： 1389-1987

Source： Brain and Mind, Vol.3, Iss.3, 2002-12, pp. : 331-365

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Abstract

The explanatory gap and the knowledge argument are rooted in the conflation of propositional and phenomenal knowledge. The basic knowledge argument is based on the consideration that ``physical information'' about the nervous system is unable to provide the knowledge of a ``color experience'' (Jackson, 1982). The implication is that physicalism is incomplete or false because it leaves something unexplained. The problem with Jackson's argument is that physical information has the form of highly symbolic propositional knowledge whereas phenomenal knowledge consists in innate neurophysiological processes. In addition to their fundamental epistemological differences, clinical, anatomical, pathological and brain imaging studies demonstrate that phenomenal and propositional knowledge are fundamentally different neurobiological processes. Propositional knowledge is phylogenetically new, highly symbolic, culturally acquired, exclusively human and expressible in different natural and artificial languages. By contrast, phenomenal knowledge (i.e.: knowing what-it-is-like to see a color) consists in qualitative experiences and phenomenal concepts that provide an internal, language-independent reference to the properties of objects and the needs of the organism. Language and propositional knowledge are exclusively human attributes implemented in specific regions of the dominant hemisphere. This contrasts sharply with the phylogenically sensory areas that are common to animals and humans, which implement qualitative experiences. Experiences are hard-wired neurobiological processes that can neither be transmitted nor re-created through the symbolism of propositions. Thus, I conclude that the fallacy in the explanatory gap and in the knowledge argument is a fallacy of equivocation</i> that results from ignoring fundamental neurobiological differences between phenomenal and propositional knowledge.</p>