Negligence, Belief, Blame and Criminal Liability: The Special Case of Forgetting

Author: Husak Douglas  

Publisher: Springer Publishing Company

ISSN: 1871-9791

Source: Criminal Law and Philosophy, Vol.5, Iss.2, 2011-06, pp. : 199-218

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Abstract

Commentators seemingly agree about what negligence is</i>—and how it is contrasted from recklessness. They also appear to concur about whether particular examples (both real and hypothetical) portray negligence. I am less confident about each of these matters. I explore the distinction between recklessness and negligence by examining a type of case that has generated a good deal of critical discussion: those in which a defendant forgets</i> that he has created a substantial and unjustifiable risk of harm. Even in this limited kind of example, no single perspective on blame and liability proves to be defensible. Nonetheless, a discussion of this type of case is helpful because it enables us to appreciate the difficulties in understanding the nature of negligence and the ensuing uncertainty about whether penal liability for negligence is ever warranted.