Bounds for Mixed Strategy Equilibria and the Spatial Model of Elections

Author： Banks J.S.   Duggan J.   Le Breton M.  

Publisher： Academic Press

ISSN： 0022-0531

Source： Journal of Economic Theory, Vol.103, Iss.1, 2002-03, pp. : 88-105

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